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In support of Descartes’ epistemology, Lex Newman advances the ‘Non-atheistic-knowl-
edge-thesis’, i.e., indefeasible knowledge cannot be gained unless the existence of God is 
proved. Here I expound the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics’, which, unlike 
Newman’s, refers to how four Cartesian metaphysical conclusions require the existence of 
God. To test whether such conclusions need divine existence, we may ask what would hap-
pen if God did not play any decisive role in the Meditations. As I argue, four unpalatable 
consequences would follow for Cartesian metaphysics, which would ruin Descartes’ plan to 
refute the skeptic and the atheist alike. 
Keywords: Cartesian metaphysics, God, the non-atheistic-knowledge-thesis.
RESUMO
Em apoio à epistemologia de Descartes, Lex Newman avança a “tese do conhecimento 
não-ateu”, ou seja, o conhecimento irrevogável não pode ser obtido a menos que a exis-
tência de Deus seja provada. Aqui eu exponho a “tese-não-ateísta-da-metafísica- cartesia-
na”, que, ao contrário de Newman, refere-se a como quatro conclusões metafísicas carte-
sianas requerem a existência de Deus. Para testar se tais conclusões precisam da existência 
divina, podemos perguntar o que aconteceria se Deus não desempenhasse nenhum papel 
decisivo nas Meditações. Como argumento, quatro consequências desagradáveis se segui-
riam para a metafísica cartesiana, que arruinaria o plano de Descartes de refutar tanto os 
céticos quanto os ateus.
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Introduction
Although Cartesian metaphysics is mostly developed in the Meditations, many commenta-
tors believe that the role that God plays there is either irrelevant or unnecessary.3 Against this be-
lief, Lex Newman argues that the success of Descartes’ epistemology depends upon the existence 
of God, a requirement that gives rise to the ‘non-atheistic-knowledge-thesis’ (Newman, 2016, 
p. 16). Briefly put, this thesis holds that since Descartes’ metaphysical doubt can affect all knowl-
edge claims, even of necessary truths, the existence of God must be proved to counter the threat 
posed by radical skeptics and atheists (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 36, 25.) Thus, divine existence 
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is required for the foundation of knowledge, that is, for a step 
beyond the defense of the Archimedean point.
In what follows, I expound a thesis stronger than Lex 
Newman’s, namely, the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Carte-
sian-metaphysics’. In particular, I argue that four Cartesian 
metaphysical conclusions require the existence of God in 
the Meditations. This means that if God did not play a de-
cisive role there, four unpalatable consequences would fol-
low for Descartes’ metaphysics, all of which are stated in the 
following sections. As the first one describes, although the 
cogito could be stated, we would be metaphysically isolated. 
The second section looks at how metaphysical doubt would 
make all knowledge claims defeasible. The third addresses 
how conceivable truths would be unreliable, even if they 
are perceived as clear and distinct ideas. The fourth section 
shows how mind and body could not be disjoined, because 
God can separate what is distinct, but exists closely joined. 
Incidentally, the latter consequence would also hinder the 
investigation into the soul and,  ecifically, whether it is tru-
ly immortal.
Metaphysical isolation 
In spite of the fact that there has been an important 
academic debate about Descartes’ main goals in the Medita-
tions, it seems that the original subtitle, in 1641,4 is sufficient 
to grasp what he intends to achieve there, namely, to prove: 
(i) the existence of God; and (ii) why the soul is immor-
tal. In doing so, the French philosopher aims to give a clear 
demonstration that neither the skeptics nor the atheists can 
be right. Since the bedrock of knowledge can be found, not 
everything can be doubted, and thus certain knowledge is 
possible. However, as Lex Newman argues, this conclusion 
depends upon the proof of the existence of God, which is 
metaphysical knowledge. 
In relation to this proof, Descartes adopts the skeptical 
method to find the abovementioned bedrock of knowledge. 
Even though a number of scholars have insisted that there 
exists what can be dubbed ‘Cartesian skepticism’ (Williams, 
1986, p. 28-49), this idea does not seem right after we thor-
oughly read the first Meditation and the metaphysical doubt 
as a method. In fact, the French philosopher is clear when he 
asserts that he will use the skeptical method to assess whether 
the foundation of knowledge is possible at all. If no founda-
tion can be found, there would be no certainty and the hy-
perbolic would not be stopped. As such, the relation between 
knowledge and certainty is crucial: if we find the Archime-
dean point (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 24, 16), we will gain cer-
tain knowledge at last. But is that feat possible at all?
Finishing the first Meditation in a pessimistic mood, 
Descartes doubts that certain knowledge claims can be 
genuine knowledge. If everything is doubtful, even math-
ematical truths like 2+2=4, then the skeptic may be right 
and, since the doubt cannot be stopped, we should su end 
judgement altogether. However, most skeptics do not con-
sider a hypothesis that makes Cartesian doubt even more 
radical than their own: God may turn out to be a malicious 
demon who deceives us about the existence of everything. 
In turn, the ancient skeptics cast doubt upon the reliability 
of judgements or beliefs, i.e., whether beliefs or judgements 
can be compared to other contrary beliefs or judgements. 
They aim at balanced beliefs (isosthenia), which leads to the 
su ension of judgement (epoché) and tranquility (ataraxia). 
In view of the su ension of judgement, Descartes asserts at 
the end of the first Meditation:
I will suppose therefore that not God, who 
is supremely good and the source of truth, 
but rather some malicious demon of the ut-
most power and cunning has employed all 
his energies in order to deceive me […]
I am like a prisoner who is enjoying an 
imaginary freedom while asleep; as he be-
gins to suspect that he is asleep, he dreads 
being woken up, and goes along with the 
pleasant illusion as long as he can. In the 
same way, I happily slide back into my old 
opinions and dread being shaken out of 
them, for fear that my peaceful sleep may 
be followed by hard labor when I wake, 
and that I shall have to toil not in the light, 
but amid the inextricable darkness of the 
problems I have now raised (Descartes, 
2008, AT VII 23, 15).
As a result, Descartes’ metaphysics requires that the ex-
istence of God be proved; and only then would it follow that 
we are not prisoners of a dream. In other words, if the proof 
about the existence of God cannot be given at all, then Des-
cartes will remain a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary 
freedom while asleep. Moreover, if the existence of God could 
not be proved in any sense, we would be metaphysically iso-
lated: the world could turn out to be a dream, even though it 
seems totally real.  
In the second Meditation, he achieves what has been 
called the cogito. That is, after doubting the senses, the exter-
nal world, his own body, the existence of God, and so on, he 
acknowledges that, in order to doubt, he must be thinking. 
Besides this conclusion, he holds that if the malicious demon 
4 The original subtitle, of the first edition in 1641, stressed the need to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. 
The subtitle is this: ‘in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the immortality of the soul’ (Descartes, 2008,  Meditations, 
VII, I). By contrast, the subtitles of the second edition in 1642, and of the French translation in 1647, are slightly different: ‘in which are 
demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the body’ (Descartes, 2008, Meditations, VII, I). In 
any case, all these subtitles are compatible with my arguments about the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics.’
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ceaselessly deceives him, he must be something to be de-
ceived. In fact, it is utterly impossible to be deceived if one 
does not exist at all. 
By advancing this two-fold argument, Descartes pres-
ents the cogito ergo sum, or ‘I think, therefore I am.’ At last, 
he has found the bedrock of knowledge, that is, the point at 
which hyperbolic doubt comes to a close. This additionally 
shows that the skeptic must be wrong, because an unpre-
dicted conclusion has been drawn, namely, hyperbolic doubt, 
which is deeply metaphysical, finally leads him to certain 
knowledge. But what happens with those things that we usu-
ally consider more certain than our own existence, like that 
which we touch or see? 
So far, Descartes has shown that he is certain about 
his own being: he is nothing but a thinking thing (Descartes, 
2008, AT VII 27-28, 18-19). However, is that enough from 
a metaphysical viewpoint? Even so, the metaphysical status 
of the cogito leads to the problem that Descartes inevitably 
faces metaphysical isolation, in the sense that he is not cer-
tain about the existence of anything else in the world. Things 
like chairs, beds, trees, houses and the like may be part of a 
dream: the certainty with which we attribute to them may 
only be an illusion. As the existence of God has not yet been 
e ablished, another maneuver is necessary: Descartes goes 
a step further by insisting what a thinking thing finally is. 
After entertaining the clarity and distinction of the cogito, 
Descartes proceeds to consider whether ideas of extend-
ed things are truer than the cogito, that is, whether objects 
whose existence seems to be obvious lead to ideas that have 
more clarity and distinction than the cogito. For this very 
reason, he analyzes the essence of a piece of wax and how 
the existence of other individuals is stated (Descartes, 2008, 
AT VII 30-1, 20-21). In fact, the existence of other individ-
uals, which has not been proved either, may also be part of a 
dream created by the malicious demon.
As to the piece of wax, he examines its main prop-
erties, which are seen or touched, such as its color, odor, 
sweetness, and so on. Even such properties are carefully 
examined by him; so if the wax were to be heated, the con-
tingent properties, those that the wax may lack and still 
remain what it is, would disappear or change dramatically. 
As a consequence, Descartes asserts that what is seen or 
touched is, like things perceived by the senses, unreliable. 
Still, it is worth remarking that one property remains, 
namely, the extension of the piece of wax. Nevertheless, 
this property is neither seen nor touched; rather, the ex-
tension of the piece of wax is only examined by the power 
of the intellect. This is even more clear when it comes to 
determining the essence of the wax in general. In addition, 
it is clear that the words deceive us in that they wrongly 
make us believe that the essence of the wax is what is seen 
or touched (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 30, 20). 
The words may be deceitful about what the extended 
objects finally are. In order to prove this, Descartes gives the 
example of those individuals he sees through the window. 
The passage is the following:
[…] I am amazed at how weak and prone to 
error my mind is. For although I am thinking 
about these matters within myself, silently 
and without speaking, nonetheless the actu-
al words bring me up short, and I am almost 
tricked by ordinary ways of talking. We say 
that we see the wax itself, if it is there before 
us, not that we judge it to be there from its 
colour or shape; and this might lead me to 
conclude without more ado that knowledge 
of the wax comes from what the eye sees, 
and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. 
But then if I look out the window and see 
men crossing the square, as I just happen to 
have done, I normally say that I see the men 
themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. 
Yet do I see any more than hats and coats 
which could conceal automatons? I judge 
that they are men. And so something which 
I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact 
grasped solely by the faculty of judgement 
which is in my mind (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 
32, 21, emphasis in original). 
Again, what is seen or touched may be deceitful, and 
so are words: if one only trusts the senses, it may turn out 
that even if we see certain individuals, they may turn out 
to be automatons with hats and coats. By contrast, the fac-
ulty of judgement, which is in our minds, reveals wheth-
er they are real individuals rather than mere automatons. 
Thus, words make us believe that the essence of men, and 
of all extended objects, is only identified by the senses 
(Descartes, 2008, AT VII 32, 21), which is utterly wrong: 
Descartes judges that he is in the presence of certain indi-
viduals, and this may even show him that he is not in the 
presence of automatons. 
Consequently, the existence of God and other men 
must be e ablished in Cartesian metaphysics by means of the 
intellect alone. As I have argued, Descartes would be meta-
physically isolated otherwise. For he would be, in virtue of the 
cogito, only a thinking thing that exists in a world with the 
shadow of things. 
Descartes emphasizes this point as follows:
If the objective reality of any of my ideas 
turns out to be so great that I am sure the 
same reality does not reside in me, either 
formally or eminently, and hence that I my-
self cannot be the cause, it will necessarily 
follow that I am not alone in the world, but 
some other thing which is the cause of this 
idea also exists (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 42, 
29, my emphasis).
In the next section, I show that, if the existence of God 
remains without an adequate proof, Descartes would addi-
tionally face epistemological uncertainty, to wit, he would not 
be able to gain indefeasible knowledge at all. For this very rea-
son he crafts the causal proof for the existence of God.
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Epistemological uncertainty 
fueled by the metaphysical doubt
The Cartesian criterion of truth is twofold. On the one 
hand, all doubtful ideas, which are like opinions, can be con-
sidered false. But, it is not necessary to show that all opinions 
are doubtful, a process that is technically impossible; rather, 
it is sufficient to show that the source of opinions is unreli-
able. The senses are, in this re ect, doubtful, because they 
may lead to false opinions. For example, the point that can be 
seen from a long distance may turn out to be a building from 
a closer distance. Thus, a judgement about the point seen on 
the horizon is simply doubtful, as it is caused by the senses, 
which are unreliable. On the other hand, Descartes holds that 
all clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true; in fact, they are 
real knowledge. For this reason, the hyperbolic doubt must 
stop at a  ecific point: if we clearly and distinctly conceive an 
idea that is not doubtful, we have gained certain knowledge. 
A passage that synthesizes the second element of the Carte-
sian criterion of truth is the following:
Do I not therefore also know what is required 
for my being certain about anything? In this 
first item of knowledge there is simply a clear 
and distinct perception of what I am assert-
ing; this would not be enough to make me 
certain of the truth of the matter if it could 
ever turn out that something which I per-
ceived with such clarity and distinctness was 
false. So I now seem to be able to lay down 
as a general rule that whatever I perceive 
very clearly and distinctly is true (Descartes, 
2008, AT VII 35, 24, my emphasis).
With this twofold criterion of truth in mind, Descartes 
offers the first argument for the existence of God in the third 
Meditation. This is the so-called “causal” argument, which 
proves God’s existence by a posteriori means.5 The argument 
can be summarized as follows:
Assumptions:
(1) Something cannot come from nothing.
(2)  There cannot be more reality in the effect than in 
the cause.
(3)  The objective reality of any idea will be adequate to 
or correspond to the formal reality of the thing of 
which it is the idea.   
Proof:
(1)  I have an idea of God (an infinite, eternal, unchang-
ing, etc., substance)
(2) Something must have caused that idea. (ass. 1)
(3)  I cannot be the cause of that idea (being finite), nor 
any other finite thing. (ass. 2)
(4)  So then some existent thing equally powerful to this 
idea must have been the cause of it, for otherwise we 
obtain an infinite regress. (ass. 3)
(5) But such a thing is God.
(6) Therefore, God exists. 
Thus, Descartes argues by a posteriori for the existence 
of God. If the divinity did not exist, we would have an idea 
of infinitude and perfection that would have come ex nihilo, 
which is simply impossible given the principle of causality de-
scribed in (2). 
In addition, Descartes provides a second ontologi-
cal-type proof for the existence of God in the fifth Meditation 
(Descartes, 2008, AT VII 35, 24) and the Principles of Philoso-
phy, which I also summarize in what follows. 
According to Descartes, there is one idea of a supremely 
powerful and intelligent being that stands out among all other 
ideas. In this one idea “the mind recognizes existence – not 
merely the possible and contingent existence which belongs 
to the ideas of all other things which it distinctly perceives, 
but utterly and necessary existence” (Descartes, 2007, AT VII-
IA 10, 197, my emphasis). By doing so, Descartes endorses 
the distinction made by Aquinas in which the a priori proof, 
which is based upon the notion of clearly perceived substance, 
requires existence. The a priori proof in the Meditations is 
crucial to grasp the relation between God’s perfection and his 
necessary existence (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 67, 46). Thus, 
both arguments for the existence of God have a clear meta-
physical flavor: a supreme being necessarily exists, and insofar 
as all truth depends upon the existence of God, there would 
be no certainty whatsoever if knowledge of him were impos-
sible (Descartes, 2007, AT VIIIA 10, 197).6
We may encounter a second obstacle if the existence of 
God could not be proved. In that case, in addition to meta-
physical isolation, one would face epistemological uncertain-
ty, i.e., one would never be certain about the truth of any-
thing, even if clear and distinct ideas were involved. Descartes 
considers this possibility, e ecially as to mathematical truths:
[…] physics, astronomy, medicine, and all 
other disciplines which depend on the 
5 Aquinas distinguishes between demonstrations a priori and those that proceed a posteriori. Whereas the former proceed from the 
cause to the effect (as the ontological proof), the latter proceed from the effect to the cause (as the cosmological proof, of which Des-
cartes’ causal proof is a variation). Here I discuss first the a posteriori proof, that is to say, demonstration from effects that are known to 
us better to the inference of a cause that is otherwise unknown to us. Following this, I discuss how Descartes proceeds to a second a 
priori demonstration, namely, from the cause itself. For further discussion see Brecher (1976, p. 418-432). 
6 Of course, Descartes’ proofs about the existence of God can be discussed further and in much more detail. Given the present discus-
sion, which aims to show how four unpalatable consequences follow if the existence of God could not be established in the Meditations, 
it seems proper to leave it there.
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study of composite things, are doubtful; 
while arithmetic, geometry and other sub-
jects of this kind, which deal with the sim-
plest and most general things, regardless 
of whether they really exist in nature or 
not, contain something certain and indubi-
table. For whether I am awake or asleep, 
two and three added together are five, 
and a square has no more than four sides. 
It seems impossible that such transparent 
truths should incur any suspicion of being 
false (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 20, 14, my 
emphasis).
This passage seems to be decisive as to the debate about 
mathematical truths, which are simple and general, even if 
God did not exist. Nevertheless, if the existence of God were 
either denied or not acknowledged in the Meditations, and a 
malicious demon deceived us all the time, we would not be 
certain about any knowledge claim whatsoever. A context in 
which the malicious demon deceived us would be highly un-
reliable. But this idea is inconsistent with a previous remark 
made by Descartes. Prior to having written the Meditations, 
he holds that all truths are a product of and are dependent 
upon the existence of God. A letter to Mersenne (15 April 
1630) supports this view thus:
The mathematical truths which you call eter-
nal have been laid down by God and depend 
on him entirely no less than the rest of his 
creatures. Indeed, to say that these truths 
are independent of God is to talk of him as 
if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject 
him to the Styx and the Fates. Please do not 
hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere 
that it is God who has laid down these 
laws in nature just as a king lays down 
laws in his kingdom (Descartes, 1997, AT I 
145-146, 23, my emphasis).
This standpoint about mathematical truths and their 
connection with God, necessity and knowledge slightly 
changes in the Meditations. All necessary truths depend upon 
God’s will, as he creates and maintains all things (Descartes, 
1997, AT IV 314, 272). We discover mathematical truths, such 
as the recognition that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right angles.
In the Meditations, the French philosopher also makes 
truth depend upon divine omnipotence and thus he clearly 
argues for the existence of innate ideas, which make possible 
real knowledge. When recognizing the true judgement about 
the triangle, not through the senses, but with the power of 
judgement, some wrongly believe that such truths are only 
products of the human mind. Descartes is very emphatic on 
this point, when he asserts that it is because God “willed to 
create the world in time that it is better this way than if he 
had created it from eternity; and it is because he willed that 
the three angles of a triangle should necessarily equal two 
right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise; and so on in 
other cases” (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 432, 291, my emphasis). 
Necessary truths, then, have been created and depend upon 
God; we must discover them with the aid of the reason. 
To recapitulate, all things which have been created have 
been created by God, and this includes composite true ideas, 
as in astronomy, as well as simple true ideas, as in geometry 
or mathematics. Again, all truths, and e ecially the eternal ones 
that constitute knowledge, depend upon the existence of God, and 
this is so when we acknowledge that human being is prone to 
error and, moreover, in relation to truths which are clearly 
and distinctly perceived by the intellect (Descartes, 2008, AT 
VII 70, 48).
Concerning metaphysical doubt, far-fetched scenarios 
are also examined by Descartes. Such scenarios include the 
possibility that mathematics may have been created by a ma-
licious demon, or worse yet, that all human cognitive systems 
have been distorted to the extent that, even if we conceived 
clear and distinct ideas, these would turn out to be all false. 
Descartes remarks that such a metaphysical possibility needs 
to be ruled out in the following passage: 
And since I have no cause to think that 
there is a deceiving god at all, and I do not 
yet even know for sure whether there is a 
God at all, any reason for doubt which de-
pends simply on this supposition is a very 
slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one. 
But in order to remove even this slight rea-
son for doubt, as soon as the opportunity 
arises I must examine whether there is a 
God, and, if there is, whether he can be a 
deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems 
that I can never be quite certain about 
anything else (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 36, 
25, my emphasis).
This argument, which is fundamental to the Medita-
tions, should serve as sufficient evidence against the view that 
the existence of God is irrelevant to Cartesian metaphysics. 
If God does not exist, the aforementioned metaphysical 
doubt cannot be ruled out, and even mathematics and geom-
etry may turn out to be unreliable. Lex Newman, who has 
dubbed this view as the ‘Non-atheistic-Knowledge-Thesis,’ 
emphasizes the following passage:
The fact that an atheist can be “clearly 
aware [clare cognoscere] that the three an-
gles of a triangle are equal to two right an-
gles” is something I do not dispute. But I 
maintain that this awareness [cognitionem] 
of his is not true knowledge [scientiam], 
since no act of awareness [cognitio] that can 
be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called 
knowledge [scientia]. Now since we are sup-
posing that this individual is an atheist, he 
cannot be certain that he is not being de-
ceived on matters which seem to him to be 
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very evident (as I fully explained) (Descartes, 
2008, AT VII 141, 101).
Thus, there is a very important difference between be-
ing clearly aware of a truth, a state in which the atheist can be, 
and having indefeasible knowledge about a truth. In the same 
vein, we can be clearly aware of the fact that the sum of two 
prime numbers does result in a non-prime number, but we 
would not have indefeasible knowledge about this fact until 
we entertain a definitive proof. Unlike what goes on with al-
gorithms and their Gödelization (Penrose, 1999), the point 
here is very simple: awareness of certain truths does not en-
tail indefeasible knowledge, and this occurs with God and all 
mathematical truths. One can be aware of them, but this does 
not entail that one knows them, because only God guarantees 
they are true knowledge. 
In summary, if the existence of God is not proved, 
even clear and distinct ideas may turn out to be false. Such 
a metaphysical possibility, which seems hard to deny, needs 
to be ruled out, according to the Cartesian agenda. As I have 
shown here, the existence of God has not only an epistemo-
logical consequence, but a metaphysical one. Both are crucial 
to understand what Descartes’ aims to accomplish, namely, 
the definite refutation of the skeptic and the atheist.
The inexistence of God: 
no secure conceivability
A number of philosophers hold that substance dualism 
entails the separation of two substances, which can exist on 
their own (Searle 2004). Such a view of Descartes’ metaphys-
ics, however, is an oversimplification. Indeed, Cartesian dual-
ism relies upon what can be clearly and distinctly conceived; 
hence, to assess whether two substances are different, and 
may exist separately, we must examine whether they can be 
separated by the understanding and, more precisely, by means 
of conceivability. Using such means, Descartes puts forward 
what has been called the modal intuition argument. 
Briefly put, a modal intuition argument is a metaphysi-
cal argument according to which, if two things are different, 
they can exist separately. Moreover, if things are identical, 
they cannot exist disjointedly. For example, and to put things 
simply, if state and government are different things, they can 
exist separately, even excluding each other. Now, it seems that 
government may exist without a state, and a state may ex-
ist without government. As a matter of fact, a tribe is a sort 
of government that lacks a state, and a state may lack gov-
ernment. Therefore, state and government are two different 
things, although they may coexist together. Usually, a govern-
ment requires a state, and a state needs a government. Then, 
according to a modal intuition argument, if two things are the 
same thing, they cannot be separated, while if two things are 
different they can, excluding one another. I will return to this 
issue again in the next section.
On Descartes’ view, God allows us to reason in modal 
terms, that is, by means of conceivability. Modal reasoning 
supposes that clear and distinct modal ideas are necessarily 
true. But how is God related to modal reasoning? We have al-
ready examined the relation between truths and reasoning in 
the previous sections: all truths exist because God has e ab-
lished them as such, i.e., because He has created them. Contra 
atheists, truths, like all things, metaphysically depend upon 
the existence of God. Then, to say, for example, that mathe-
matical truths, which are necessarily true, may exist without 
God is like thinking that He is akin to Jupiter or Saturn, etc. 
God allows us to e ablish truths which would not exist 
otherwise. Descartes is very emphatic on this point, e ecially 
in relation to modal intuition arguments. In fact, he claims 
the following about such arguments: “First, I know that ev-
erything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable 
of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with 
my understanding of it’” (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 78, 54). 
Although we will return to these words in the next section, it 
is crucial to emphasize their importance here. Modal truths 
depend upon the existence of God, because He allows the pos-
sibility of things to exist, just as we have conceived them. Take, 
for example, this situation: James conceives that bachelors and 
unmarried persons are identical. If so, there would be no cir-
cumstances in which bachelors exist but unmarried persons 
do not. Likewise, there would be no circumstances in which 
unmarried persons exist but bachelors do not. Thus, James 
concludes, it is impossible that bachelors are not unmarried 
persons, and hence the former are necessarily the latter. 
Or, put differently, bachelors do not exclude unmarried per-
sons, and vice versa.
Now, James would be totally wrong if what we conceive 
as metaphysically possible and necessary were not reliable 
judgements. Indeed, James relies upon the following line of 
reasoning: conceivability is a guide to metaphysical possibil-
ity and necessity. The debate about this issue has been very 
popular in contemporary philosophy, as many thought exper-
iments in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, polit-
ical philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy 
of mind rely on situations which describe imagined scenarios 
which are not contradictory (Szabó Gendler, 2000, p. 34). 
Obviously, contradictions are impossible, so they cannot lead 
to any knowledge whatsoever. 
There seems to be a consensus that Descartes himself 
inaugurated the debate about the relation between conceiv-
ability and possibility in the early modern period. In the first 
place, he refers to the impossibility of contradictions in the 
following terms: 
All self-contradictoriness or impossibili-
ty resides solely in our thought, when we 
make the mistake of joining together mu-
tually inconsistent ideas; it cannot occur in 
anything outside the intellect. For the very 
fact that something exists outside the intel-
lect manifestly shows that it is not self-con-
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tradictory, but possible (Descartes, 2008, 
AT VII 152, 108).
It is worth remarking that God is related to this argu-
ment again. In fact, God’s almighty powers allow material 
things to exist:
It remains for me to examine whether ma-
terial things exist. And at least I now know 
they are capable of existing, in so far as they 
are the subject-matter of pure mathematics, 
since I perceive them clearly and distinctly. 
For there is no doubt that God is capable 
of creating everything that I am capable of 
perceiving in this manner; and I have never 
judged that something could not be made 
by him except on the grounds that there 
would be a contradiction in my perceiving 
it distinctly (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 72, 50, 
my emphasis).
As we know that contradictions cannot be perceived 
distinctly, it follows that God allows them to exist only in our 
intellect. Here God allows those contradictions to exist, but 
only as mistakes that need be corrected by reason. Accord-
ingly, and as stated above, we cannot clearly and distinctly 
perceive contradictions, since they are imperfections to be 
corrected. 
Note that, in Descartes’s view, what can be conceived by 
the understanding cannot be imagined. For him, imagination 
and conceivability via understanding are utterly different, 
since only the latter helps us pin down, for example, compli-
cated geometrical figures. He refers to the difference between 
imagination and conceivability as follows:
If I want to think of a chiliagon, although I 
understand that it is a figure consisting of a 
thousand sides just as well as I understand 
a triangle to be a three-sized figure, I do 
not in that same way imagine the thousand 
sides or see them as if they were present 
before me […] I may construct in my mind 
a confused representation of some figure; 
but it is clear that this is not a chiliagon. For 
it differs in no way from the representation I 
should form if I were thinking of a myriagon, 
or any figure with very many sides (Des-
cartes, 2008, AT VII 72, 50).
As Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 17) point 
out, the difference between intellect and imagination is even 
sharper when it comes to knowing the soul. In the second 
Meditation, Descartes writes as follows:
It would […] be a case of fictitious invention 
if I used my imagination to establish that I 
was something or other; for imagining is 
simply contemplating the shape or image 
of a corporeal thing […] thus […] none of 
the things that imagination enables me to 
grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of 
myself which I possess (Descartes, 2008, AT 
VII 28, 19).
As stated above, when analyzing what the soul is, only 
understanding and intellect are helpful; this is usually so with 
reasoning about metaphysical truths. This ability to grasp 
such truths requires that the soul perceives what the soul is 
in terms of intellectual acts, a point that reminds us that the 
mind is a primitive notion, that is, a notion which cannot be 
described in terms of any other unfamiliar notion.
It seems clear that Descartes endorses a strategy accord-
ing to which conceivability provides us with a guide to what 
is and is not possible. The divine powers seem to be crucial, as 
the following passage shows: “I know that everything which I 
clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created 
by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of 
it”’ (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 78, 54). These words are repeat-
ed elsewhere in the following manner: “The rule ‘whatever we 
can conceive of can exist’ is my own, it is true only so long as 
we are dealing with a conception which is clear and distinct, 
a conception which embraces the possibility of the thing in 
question, since God can bring about whatever we clearly per-
ceive to be possible” (Descartes, 2007, AT VIIIB 352, 299).
But here the important point for the present discussion 
is this: if the existence of God were not proved in the Medi-
tations, we would not be able to state the difference between 
things that we clearly and distinctly conceive and those that 
we think we clearly and distinctly conceive. This would blur 
the line between reliable and unreliable conception, e e-
cially in regards to modal reasoning. For instance, if God did 
not exist, then we could conclude that bachelors are unmar-
ried persons. 
Still more, the inexistence of God may bring about other 
major problems in metaphysics. According to Descartes, as 
modal reasoning is closely related to metaphysics, there would 
not exist a way to assess whether or not metaphysical truths 
must be necessarily true. Moreover, this would affect contra-
dictoriness and self-contradictoriness, because both are in the 
end dependent upon intro ective identifiability, which in 
turn requires the aid of God. Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne 
emphasize how Descartes aims to avoid this problem thus: 
[…] Descartes has a theological answer 
available. While acknowledging that ‘in the 
case of our clearest and most careful judge-
ments […] if such judgements were false 
they could not be corrected by any clear 
judgements or by means of any other facul-
ty’ […] (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 143) none-
theless maintains that we have reason to be 
sanguine. For, Descartes contends, it is inco-
herent to suppose that God would allow us 
to be deceived under such circumstances, 
since it would be contradictory to suppose 
‘anything should be created by him which 
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positively tends towards falsehood’ (Des-
cartes, 2008, AT VII, 144). […] for those of us 
unwilling to appeal to divine benevolence, 
the problem is not so easily escaped (Szabó 
Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, p. 20).
The problem of modal reasoning is, likewise, closely re-
lated to Descartes’ dualism. This view appeals to modal intu-
ition arguments, which can flesh out how the mind and the 
body can be separated and exclude one another.
  
The inexistence of God 
entails the inseparability 
of mind and body 
There are several myths about Descartes’ dualism. One 
of them, and perhaps the most common, is the view that du-
alism implies that mind and body are two disjoined substances. 
As stated above, this is a mistake, since mind and body are 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled. More important-
ly, they cannot be separated, save in our intellect and, most 
importantly, by God. After putting forward the modal intu-
ition argument, which I will analyze thoroughly below, Des-
cartes insists that mind and body are closely joined thus:
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations 
of pain, hunger, thirst, and so on, that I am 
not merely present in my body as a sailor is 
present in a ship, but that I am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with 
it, so that I and the body form a unit. If 
this were not so, I, who am nothing but a 
thinking thing, would not feel pain when 
the body was hurt, but would perceive the 
damage purely by the intellect, just as a 
sailor perceives by sight if anything in his 
ship is broken […] For these sensations of 
hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing 
but confused modes of thinking which arise 
from the union and, as it were, intermin-
gling of the mind with the body (Des-
cartes, 2008, AT VII 81, 56, my emphasis).
The argument offered by Descartes here is a dis-anal-
ogy: if the body and the mind were totally disjoined, they 
would be like that of the sailor and the ship. Mind and body, 
despite being two distinct substances that exclude each other, are 
closely conjoined. In fact, two things can be different but 
closely joined. Think of the following example: a tape and a 
surface. In this situation there are two closely joined objects, 
even though they can be separated. The point around which 
some scholars have wrongly focused is Descartes’ emphasis 
upon the modal intuition argument. 
This argument has two crucial sides, namely, a modal 
and a metaphysical one. A connection between these two 
sides is the following: modal reasoning, which is backed up by 
God’s will, can e ablish metaphysical truths about identical 
or different substances. Again, it is worth discussing the role 
God plays in this argument. In my opinion, it is very clear 
that the omnipotent divine powers of God are crucial to the ad-
equate development of the argument. Concerning this point, 
he writes the following:
First, I know that everything which I clearly 
and distinctly understand is capable of being 
created by God so as to correspond exactly 
with my understanding of it. Hence the fact 
that I can clearly and distinctly understand 
one thing apart from another is enough to 
make me certain that the two things are dis-
tinct, since they are capable of being sepa-
rated, at least by God. The question of what 
power is required to bring about such a sep-
aration does not affect the judgement that 
the two things are distinct […] 
But nevertheless, on the one hand I have a 
clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as 
I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; 
and on the other hand, I have a distinct 
idea of the body, in so far as it is simply an 
extended, non-thinking thing. And accord-
ingly, it is certain that I am really distinct 
from my body, and can exist without it (Des-
cartes, 2008, AT VII 78).
Note that no contradiction between the pilot and the 
ship dis-analogy and the modal intuition argument exists. As 
explained, the latter argument assumes that mind and body 
are distinct, as they can be separated by the intellect. But, in 
reality, they are closely conjoined and, as such, intermingled. 
Now, the French philosopher also holds that the power 
required to bring about that separation does not matter. Undoubt-
edly, this assumption and the existence of God are intertwined 
because we cannot understand God, although we may conclude 
that He necessarily exists. In fact, Descartes explicitly refers to 
the problem that arises from not distinguishing between un-
derstanding and conceiving God. The existence of God can be 
conceived by making the argument described above. In turn, 
we lack the power to fully understanding divinity.
That argument about the existence of God rests on 
a clear and distinct idea, namely, God’s infinitude and per-
fection. Descartes stresses this when remarking that the ex-
istence of the divinity cannot be separated from the idea of 
God. Therefore, it is contradictory to think of a perfect be-
ing, a supremely perfect being, that does not exist; if God did 
not exist, he would simply lack perfection. This would be as 
contradictory as thinking of a mountain without a valley, or 
a triangle without three sides (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 66, 
46). As this cannot be the case, a perfect being must therefore 
exist (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 119, 85).  
Stating that God can be conceived but not fully under-
stood, Descartes writes the following passage in 1630, which 
predates the Meditations:
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[…] because it is possible to know that God 
is infinite and all powerful although our soul, 
being finite, cannot grasp or conceive him. 
In the same way we can touch a mountain 
with our hands, but we cannot put our arms 
around it as we could put them around a 
tree or something else not too large for 
them (Descartes, 1997, AT I 152, 25).
Descartes elaborates more on this view after 1641. In 
fact, he claims that there are two different things: conceiving 
God as a perfectly existing being is one thing, whereas un-
derstanding what perfection and infinitude mean is another 
thing. 
In other words, for Descartes, God is the truest and 
clearest of all deas; this clarity and distinction is prior to 
mathematical truths, which we have already examined, and 
even to the cogito (Descartes, 2008, AT VII 46, 31). Given 
these thoughts, it is evident that God creates not only math-
ematical truths, but also all those that can be perceived clearly 
and distinctly by the intellect. But, if the existence of God is 
denied or not acknowledged, would there be any hindrance 
to Descartes’ dualism?
Even though it would be possible to separate mind and 
body by means of the intellect, it would be unclear whether 
such a disassociation would be possible without the existence of 
God. For, again, the almighty God can make A and B be sep-
arated, even if they are closely conjoined. That is the case of 
mind and body, which are closely conjoined (this clarifies why 
the powers involved in separating A and B do not matter). 
Thus, if God did not exist, it would remain utterly unclear 
whether a possibility conceived by the intellect, namely, mind 
and body excluding each other, could be the case.
Contemporary philosophers of mind have taken the 
latter uncertainty about the separation of mind and body 
seriously. Unlike Descartes’ dualism, contemporary materi-
alists claim that most conceivability arguments, which have 
a Cartesian inspiration, fail to show whether mind and body 
can be separated beyond the realm of mere conceivability. 
In fact, most contemporary materialists hold that modal 
arguments cannot e ablish whether mind and body are sep-
arable, so to say, in reality (Hill, 2002). Thus, if God did not 
exist, there would be more reasons to doubt the soundness 
of Cartesian dualism.  
It ought to be noted that this uncertainty would also 
hinder the investigation into whether the soul is immortal. 
As to the accusation that perhaps God may have given the 
soul a nature which involves its mortality, Descartes argues 
the following:
 
[...] since it could still be claimed that God 
gave it such nature that its duration comes 
to an end simultaneously with the end of 
the body’s life. Here I admit that I cannot 
refute what you say. For I do not take it 
upon myself to try to use the power of hu-
man reason to settle any of those matters 
which depend on the free will of God […] In-
deed, we do not even have any convincing 
evidence or precedent to suggest that any 
substance can perish. And this entitles us to 
conclude that the mind, in so far as it can 
be known by natural philosophy, is immortal 
(Descartes, 2008, AT VII 153, 108).
According to Descartes, only God’s absolute powers can 
make the soul cease to exist. This naturally follows from the 
fact that, as God can separate substances which are closely 
joined, he can also destroy them. Again, it seems that Des-
cartes targets both the atheist and the skeptic here. According 
to the French philosopher, they have to provide an argument 
that proves that substances can be destroyed and, amongst 
those substances, the very soul. Given the cogito, neither hu-
man life is a mystery nor the nature of the soul.
Conclusion
As analyzed, Lex Newman’s non-atheistic-knowl-
edge-thesis aims to support Descartes’ epistemology, i.e., as 
to how knowledge is founded beyond skeptical doubt. But 
an important point to be debated is still missing, namely, 
that if the existence of God is not proved in the Meditations, 
both Descartes’ epistemology and his metaphysics may turn 
out to be undermined. For not only would knowledge be 
defeasible; in addition, we would risk being: (i) Metaphysi-
cally isolated; (ii) subject to metaphysical uncertainty; (iii) 
wrong about conceivability arguments; and (iv) mistaken 
about dualism and the immortality of the soul. These un-
palatable consequences would ruin Descartes’ refutation 
of the atheists and the skeptics, which is one of the aims of 
Cartesian metaphysics. This, at least, is declared within the 
first subtitle to the Meditations.
On the other hand, many scholars may argue that, if 
God did not exist, other decisive negative consequences would 
follow for Cartesian metaphysics. For example, we would be 
unable to prove the existence of material things in the sixth 
Meditation. This is true; nevertheless, the inability to draw the 
four metaphysical conclusions seems to be sufficient to ruin 
Descartes’ metaphysics, which aims to refute the skeptic and 
the atheist alike. Concerning this point, it is worth pointing 
out that Descartes shows a continuum in his metaphysical ar-
guments; for this reason, his concern to prove the existence of 
God is not new to the Meditations. Rather, it originates in the 
1630s with Descartes’ claim that all eternal truths have been 
e ablished by God, including those that are necessary, as in 
the case of mathematics. Interestingly, this view on the nature 
of truth anticipates how many Cartesian metaphysical argu-
ments, which attempt to refute both the skeptics and the athe-
ists, are necessarily dependent upon the supreme powers of 
God. Such Cartesian arguments are indeed, like all arguments, 
truth preserving. It seems, then, that the inexistence of God 
would prevent us from discovering truth in that very re ect.
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